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CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY
Owen M. Fiss*
Socialism has collapsed. The long, historic struggle between capi-
talism and socialism has come to an end, and capitalism has emerged
the victor. This turn of events was foreshadowed by the privatization
movement of the late 1970s and 1980s that swept England, the United
States, and a number of Latin American countries. History still
awaited the renunciation of socialism by those who lived it, but that
soon came in the form of the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe
and in the spiraling chain of events, set in motion by "perestroika,"
that ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December
1991. China and Cuba continue to wave the socialist banner, but to
most observers this seems an act of desperation - an effort to pro-
claim loyalty to an ideology that may be integral to their historical
identity, but which all the world has now repudiated.
Capitalism permits of many definitions, but at its core it is a system
designed to tap the motivational force of self-interest. It assumes that
individuals are autonomous actors who advance their own self-inter-
est. Capitalism encourages efficiency and productivity by forcing indi-
viduals to compete with one another and then differentially rewarding
those who are most productive, a standard that is defined in terms of
consumer satisfaction. Consumers are put to the task of choosing how
to allocate their own scarce resources among the products or services
offered, but they remain sovereign in the sense that the entire eco-
nomic system. responds to their desires. The goal of capitalism is to
maximize consumer satisfaction by producing the goods and services
they demand.
The central social institution of capitalism is the market, a theoret-
ical construct in which individuals reveal their preferences, compete
with one another, and exchange goods and services. Government has
a role to play in this scheme, but it is a limited one. It is confined to:
(a) creating a monetary system, defining property rights, and enforcing
contracts so as to facilitate the system of exchange; (b) prohibiting
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certain activities, such as monopolization or price fixing, that might
destroy the central disciplinary mechanism of the market - competi-
tion; (c) providing a substitute for market competition in situations
which permit only one producer ("natural monopolies") or where the
ordinary exchange is unlikely to take into account the full costs or
value of a good or service (e.g., "externalities" or "public goods"); and
(d) raising revenue through taxation or borrowing to finance its
operations.
These four functions set the parameters of the capitalist state.
Although state activity is conceived as minimal, each function may be
understood as permitting an ever-increasing sphere of state power.
For example, some have used the notion of market failure so gener-
ously as to justify state activism on almost the scale contemplated by
socialism. However, at the level of ideology, capitalism insists that the
state's function be narrowly and rigorously defined, so that state inter-
ference with business decisions is the exception or a matter of last re-
sort. Capitalism insists upon a sharp dichotomy between state and
economy, allowing only incidental intrusions by the state into the eco-
nomic sphere. In addition, capitalism requires the state, whenever
permitted to intervene, to try to replicate the outcomes that would be
produced by a properly functioning market. Thus, the capitalist state
is not allowed to pursue the public interest in a way understood to be
independent of consumer satisfaction; the state's function is still de-
fined in market terms.
In almost every contemporary capitalist society, including the
United States, there are significant departures in practice from the
strict capitalist model. The state does in fact intervene in the economy
in ways that cannot be justified entirely in terms of protecting the mar-
ket or correcting for its incidental failures. Typically, one can find
laws establishing maximum working hours or minimum wages, or
those protecting disadvantaged groups from discrimination on the ba-
sis of race or gender. Frequently, the state owns various industries
(e.g., education and transportation) and subsidizes others (e.g., the
arts). Of even greater significance, most capitalist countries have wel-
fare programs, or what Charles Taylor has called "mechanisms of soli-
darity," consisting of both cash payments and in-kind benefits (e.g.,
public housing). These programs are intended to maintain certain
minimum standards of living or redistribute wealth in order to modu-
late the inequalities of wealth produced by the market.
These departures from the theoretical model of capitalism intro-
duce an ambiguity into the historical record and raise the question -
at least in the minds of some - whether the recent developments in
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Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union should be understood, as I have
maintained, as an unqualified victory for capitalism. Those who take a
contrary view admit that the United States and Western Europe were
the models for the reformers in the East, but point out that since the
economic systems of the United States and Western Europe are them-
selves amalgams, it is unclear precisely what was guiding the reform-
ers and what could be said to have triumphed. Was it capitalism or
some hybrid, and, if the latter, why can't socialism make as strong a
claim to that hybrid as capitalism? Such questions will undoubtedly
consume the more philosophically inclined in the years to come, but as
a matter of historical fact - as opposed to what might have been -
the reformers perceived the amalgams of the West, especially because
they were framed by the privatization movement that so dominated
the West in the seventies and eighties, as belonging more to the capi-
talist than the socialist model. The reformers repudiated socialism
and embraced capitalism, though, like the high priest of capitalism,
Friedrich Hayek,1 they never did so with a ferociousness that pre-
cluded concessions at the practical or institutional level. Capitalism
was the ideal toward which they moved; and while it may have been a
vaguely formed aspiration, it now provides the framework within
which future debate will take place.
The appeal of capitalism was largely materialistic. Capitalism
promised to produce an abundant and diverse supply of goods and
services, and its triumph is directly and immediately related to its
demonstrated ability to deliver on that promise. The reformers viewed
the riches of the West and compared them to their own misery, and
saw in this contrast a validation of the behavioral assumptions of capi-
talism and a refutation of socialism. To them, the contrast delivered a
clear message: Workers will not work as hard, or as carefully, or as
imaginatively, when their goal is public benefit rather than self-inter-
est; consumers tend to be more satisfied when they, instead of state
officials, determine what goods and services they want. Of course, the
evidence is not so unambiguous. Many other factors, including natu-
ral and cultural resources and historic starting points, may account for
the material achievements of capitalist societies. But the superior eco-
nomic performance of the capitalist countries has been so substantial
and so pervasive - of staggering proportions when countries such as
East and West Germany are compared - as to suggest that more was
involved. The historical record provides ample reason to believe that
1. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 36-39 (1944).
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the behavioral norms of capitalism are more realistic than socialism's,
and that capitalism is likely to produce greater material wealth.
To attribute the triumph of capitalism primarily to its materialistic
advantages is not to belittle it; consumer satisfaction is of enormous
importance and essential to the proper functioning of any society.
Nonetheless, consumer satisfaction is not the only criterion for evalu-
ating a society, and thus some consideration must be given to the im-
pact capitalism has on other values, above all democracy. While the
primary allure of capitalism may have been materialistic, political con-
siderations also motivated a good number of the reformers in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. These reformers were as determined to
escape from totalitarianism as they were from their material condition,
and saw in capitalism the promise of achieving both goals. They
fought for something called "capitalist democracy," fully believing
that in the achievement of the one they would realize the other. The
question remains, not only whether they will achieve both goals, but
whether the one goal promotes the other - whether capitalism is
likely to promote democracy, or whether instead there is a tension
between the two ideologies, a dynamic within capitalism that is as an-
tithetical to true democracy as, it is to totalitarianism.
In many ways, capitalism and democracy share a number of funda-
mental premises, and many have commented on the historical paral-
lels between the rise of these two systems of belief. Just as capitalism
looks to the individual choice of consumers as the keystone for order-
ing the economy, democracy depends on individual initiative and
choice as the source of political decisionmaking. Both notions are
rooted in an assumption of human rationality and self-interest, and
thus rely on individual freedom and autonomy as the means for
achieving their ends. Capitalism and democracy are generally as-
sumed to be the best, if somewhat imperfect, means to achieving the
overriding social goals of a nation that, ideally, is composed of a uni-
versally active, engaged, and self-actualizing citizenry.
Democracy, however, also encompasses a number of principles
which are either divergent from, or entirely inconsistent with, many of
the fundamental tenets of capitalism. In the pages that follow, I out-
line five of these principles-popular sovereignty, economic indepen-
dence, enlightened choice, active participation, and citizen
contentment-all of which are fundamental to the healthy functioning
of a democratic system. I have culled some of these principles from
the socialist critique of capitalism, and in doing so my purpose is not
to resurrect a now-dead ideology, but to profit from an intellectual
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tradition that has peered deeper than any other into the flaws and
tragedies of an economic system that is now our fate.
Popular Sovereignty. Popular control over government - the idea
that government acts only at the behest of the people - lies at the root
of democratic theory and, according to many socialist critics, repre-
sents one of the fundamental points of antagonism between capitalism
and democratic values. According to the socialist critique, capital-
ism's abdication of economic control and decisionmaking to the pri-
vate sector - the separation of state and economy - removes one of
the most important aspects of modern life from popular control. Only
if economic decisions are placed under the authority of the state is
popular sovereignty assured.
Such a critique, of course, is an easy target from our current van-
tage point surveying the wreckage of socialism. Clearly, state owner-
ship of industry - the key demand of socialism - did not in fact
further democratic values. The theory of socialism presumes that
state officials in charge of the economy are responsive to the populace,
but world historical experience - the simple fact that the leading so-
cialist countries of the world, specifically the Soviet Union and China,
have been totalitarian - contradicts that premise. The officials who
ran industry or the distributional system invariably became the mas-
ters, rather than the agents, of the people, using their power to further
their own self-interest or the interests of sectarian groups. While some
might be tempted to discount this historical experience on the theory
that the totalitarianism of socialist countries was only an "excess" or
"aberration," a product of capitalist encirclement or of a desire to ac-
celerate economic development, such a response seems too facile. It
does not sufficiently account for the strength of the correlation be-
tween socialism and totalitarianism.
The defenders of capitalism, on the other hand, do not simply
point to the failures of socialism, but see capitalism itself as affirma-
tively furthering popular sovereignty. Socialism, they argue, nomi-
nally made the economy responsive to the people by substituting
public for private ownership; but, in fact, capitalism is a more effective
instrument for advancing that goal because, in a competitive market,
no single producer has power to determine the price or kinds of goods
to be produced - all are responsive to consumer demands. Monopo-
lies may have to be state owned (or state controlled), but as long as we
confront a competitive situation, economic power will be diffused.
The defenders of capitalism are right - the diffusion of power pro-
duced by competition does indeed further democratic values. But
there is still reason for concern. Even a fully competitive market does
[Vol. 13:908
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not distribute power in a manner consistent with the democratic ideal
of "one person, one vote." Although in such a market no single firm is
able to control price or determine what goods to produce, the market's
organizing principle - "one dollar, one vote" - means that firms and
individuals with unequal shares of power can influence market activity
in a way that departs from the democratic ideal. Mobil Oil stands on a
different footing from the local gas station; so does Rockefeller from
the average consumer.
Such inequalities of economic power reverberate throughout the
market, depending, of course, on its size, and they also have important
consequences for politics. Despite the rhetoric of "one person, one
vote," powerful economic interests are able to exert disproportionate
political influence and are likely to capture the state apparatus and use
it to their advantage. High government officials are recruited from the
dominant private firms and contemplate returning to the private sector
on completion of government service. Such employment practices -
the so-called "revolving door"'-- are likely to lead government offi-
cials to view issues of public policy from the vantage of private firms.
2
A similar symbiotic relationship exists in capitalist countries between
the economically powerful and electoral candidates. Highly expensive
public relations campaigns on television and in the other media often
determine the outcomes of elections, requiring candidates to become
dependent upon, or at least more responsive to, those with greater
wealth.
The results can be devastating for the electoral process. As proud
as we in the United States are of our democratic tradition, the fact
remains that those privileged by the market dominate elections. In the
typical presidential campaign almost half the population does not vote
and the so-called "electoral dropouts" or non-voters tend to be the
poor.3 Non-participation may indicate an indifference between the
contenders, but it may also indicate a profound sense of alienation and
helplessness among voters in the lower economic strata. The candi-
dates and issues that most concern these voters have been removed
from the agenda.
Economic Independence. Democracy requires more than periodic
elections and a secret ballot. It presupposes a populace freely willing
to criticize its government. In many ways, capitalism may promote
this goal by reducing the dependency of individuals on government.
2. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-Eco-
NOMIC SYSTEMS 201-13 (1977).
3. KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH 24-25 (1990).
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In contrast to life in a planned economy, a citizen who does not de-
pend upon the government for his or her job, home, or income, or who
does not need government permission to take up a trade or earn a
living, is much more free to criticize the state. There is, I believe, a
correlation between the growth of private markets in China during the
1980s and the emergence of the democratic movement in that country.
The difficulty, however, is that although capitalism may eliminate gov-
ernment dependence, it creates new economic dependencies all its
own. One dependency is substituted for another.
Capitalism will never give the masses (or even most of the middle
class) the economic autonomy contemplated by the seventeenth cen-
tury political theorists, such as John Locke, who extolled the virtues of
private property and looked to the landed gentry as a bastion of free-
dom. Capitalism produces some big winners, like Donald Trump or
Rupert Murdoch. They may have the kind of independence envi-
sioned by those who extol the democratic virtues of capitalism, but the
wealth accumulated by the great majority of the population is limited.
In fact, most citizens depend on the employment relationship for in-
come. In capitalist societies most employers are non-governmental,
and while this may enhance the freedom of citizens to criticize the
government, their new dependency impairs their freedom to criticize
their firm, their boss, or the governmental policies that sustain or sup-
port that firm. They face discharge if they speak out.4 In a political
system where the firm that exerts economic power over the individual
employee also exerts force in the political arena, individual autonomy
on a practical level is severely constrained.
Moreover, under capitalism, the power to criticize governmental
authority or otherwise participate in political life is not necessarily dis-
tributed equally, for one's ability to participate in political activities or
to make one's voice heard reflects inequalities in income, whether from
wages and salaries or from returns on investments. Inequalities in eco-
nomic power need not turn into inequalities in political power, but
they are very likely to, as witnessed by the phenomenal success of the
1992 Perot presidential campaign, since political participation requires
freedom from economic worries, leisure time, and the resources neces-
sary to get a message across to the public.
Enlightened Choice. While democracy aspires to make govern-
ment responsive to the desires of the citizenry, a question arises as to
which "desires" should govern - those of the moment, or those that
might be formulated under circumstances more closely approaching
4. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
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the optimum: over time, with full information, and under suitable
conditions of reflection. Authoritarianism has often preyed on the dis-
tinction between the "occurrent desires" of citizens and what might be
referred to as their "reflective desires." People have been enslaved on
the theory that their masters know, better than they do, their true
needs and desires. But a democracy predicated on an exclusive preoc-
cupation with occurrent desires does not present an attractive social
ideal. Our respect for the choice of a majority wanes considerably
once we learn that the choice was made hurriedly, under considerable
stress, on the basis of faulty information, or without adequate consid-
eration of alternatives. A true democracy presupposes a measure of
citizen enlightenment.
Such enlightenment is not necessarily incompatible with private
ownership. There are, however, certain industries - I will call them
informational - that do have a direct bearing on the enlightenment of
the electorate, and operating these industries on purely capitalist prin-
ciples may well endanger democratic values. One such industry is film
and television. Another is the publishing industry, including newspa-
pers, magazines and books. Still another is the education system.
Subjecting all these industries to market competition, and allowing
them to be driven by profit maximization, will produce programs of
education and entertainment that are responsive to consumer desires.
The public loves "Dallas." Yet there is no reason to believe that what
the public wants by way of entertainment or even education will be
sufficient to equip it to discharge its responsibilities in the political
sphere.
The United States has a strong, viable commitment to state social-
ism in the operation of its elementary and secondary school systems.
Some of the greatest universities of the nation, like the University of
California and the University of Michigan, are state-financed and to
some extent state-run. The more radical program to privatize the en-
tire educational system has never caught on in the United States,
though today scattered attempts are being made to revive this idea.5
Yet film, television and publishing remain in private hands. Although
many see this as one of the great bulwarks of democracy in America
- a strong and independent voice to counter the government - the
capitalist structure of ownership of these industries poses a dilemma
for democracy. Public discourse will be shaped by market factors, and
that will impair the public's capacity for enlightened choice.
A case in point may be television. In the United States, commer-
5. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-98 (1982).
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cial networks and, more recently, a number of privately-owned cable
stations have dominated the television industry. A public television
network was established in the 1960s to broaden public discourse, but
government funding has been limited, and during the seventies and
eighties - at the height of the privatization movement - it became
increasingly frail. Some Eastern European countries, emulating the
United States, are presently seeking to privatize their entire television
industry, but from democracy's perspective there is reason to be
cautious.
Commercial television may satisfy consumer desires and for that
reason be preferable, but the fact remains that the choices provided
under market capitalism are determined by a calculation of costs and
revenue, and this calculus bears no necessary, nor even probabilistic,
relationship to citizen enlightenment. Commercial television may give
viewers a choice between "Dallas" and "MTV," but it is not as likely
to produce a program analyzing the welfare system or immigration
policy. Even though the production of such educational programs
may be necessary for democracy to function, they may not be profita-
ble, especially given what viewers are prepared to pay as each decides,
on his or her own, to turn on the TV for the evening.
Active Participation. Democracy assumes the active participation
of informed and enlightened citizens in directing their own govern-
ment, yet capitalism involves a hierarchical system of management in
the economic sphere which is inimical to such involvement. State so-
cialism, as well, has tended to be hierarchical, especially as practiced
in the former Soviet Union, but this does not lessen the threat to dem-
ocratic values posed by capitalism. The cardinal assumptions underly-
ing all capitalist forms of organization are that the owners of capital
have the right to dictate how the organization shall be run, and that
they will make such decisions according to the profit motive. The
owners of capital may delegate the management of the firm to persons
they choose or, for that matter, to persons chosen by workers; but the
decision to delegate is their prerogative, and the delegation will be lim-
ited on their terms.
In some capitalist countries, employees are given a role in directing
the firm's activities. In Germany, for example, employees have a say
in worker councils at the plant level and in supervisory boards at the
firm level. Yet their actual role in governance remains limited, and
such concessions to worker management remain a rarity in capitalist
economies. (Even less common is worker ownership of capitalist en-
terprises.) The absence of worker management is problematic for de-
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mocracy because, as Carole Pateman has argued with some force,6
top-down control impedes the formation of the skills or dispositions
required of the active citizen. After laboring in a hierarchically organ-
ized workplace for eight hours, without any real say in the structure or
performance of his or her tasks, the citizen is unlikely to have, or be
inclined to exercise, the independence of judgment and critical acuity
essential to democratic politics.
Citizen participation often requires the support and aid of interme-
diate organizations. A number of such organizations, including polit-
ical parties, advocacy groups (e.g., the ACLU and NAACP),
neighborhood councils, and local parent-teacher associations, have
flourished under American capitalism and have provided important
schools in citizenship for the public. Many such organizations also
have developed as private-sector responses to perceived failings of the
capitalist system. But a tension or hostility arises between capitalism
and intermediate organizations whenever these groups attempt to in-
terfere with economic activity. Capitalism, with its ethic of competi-
tion, is highly individualistic and thus views with suspicion and
hostility any organizations of producers, workers, or consumers that
seek to affect the decisions of private capital.
Many capitalist economies have a trade union movement, but that
movement is often limited (in the United States it embraces less than
18% of the work force) and requires strong support of the law to sur-
vive. A vibrant trade union movement might threaten efficiency and
thus, as the defenders of capitalism argue, must be disempowered in
order for the system to achieve higher levels of productivity. But this
is only to recognize, not to reconcile, the tension between economic
efficiency and democratic values.
Citizen Contentment. Finally, some account must be taken of the
restless material dissatisfaction that capitalism breeds, for this will
have some effect on the forms of political life that are able to flourish
and on the stability of the democratic regime. True, capitalism aims
to satisfy consumers and appears to be a superior means of achieving
that goal, but it too is subject to economic dysfunctions, as indicated
by the Great Depression of 1929, the inflationary spirals of the 1970s
in America and, ironically, the recession in the West over the past two
or three years. Downturns of the economy and inflationary spirals can
plague every society, yet the ideology of capitalism may impair the
capacity of national leaders to deal with these crises, since it requires a
strict separation of state and economy. There is, moreover, one source
6. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970).
Capitalism
Michigan Journal of International Law
of popular dissatisfaction that is endemic to capitalism: the unequal
distribution of wealth.
At its core, capitalism promises greater productivity by introduc-
ing sharply differentiated incentives. Transference of ownership from
the state to private parties is defended on the ground that profit incen-
tives will drive private parties to operate firms efficiently. Workers
will be paid according to their productivity, which will vary greatly.
Entrepreneurship will be especially rewarded. The result will inevita-
bly be a sharply differentiated income structure.
From the perspective of material wealth, those persons at or near
the bottom of the economic order in a capitalist nation like the United
States might be better off than those at or near the bottom in a socialist
nation like the Soviet Union. They might also be better off than they
would be if the state owned and operated more industries. But these
comparisons do not lessen the sense of dissatisfaction that comes from
the most common and natural form of envy - the desire to enjoy the
kind of life others in the same society are presently enjoying.
The defenders of capitalism may assert that this sense of resent-
ment and frustration is unjustified, that such wealth differentials are
merited by the comparatively greater contributions the better-off make
to productivity. But resentments are resentments, justified or not, and
they can produce patterns of conduct - for example, violent rebel-
lions - that might destabilize a regime or frustrate the democratic
will. We saw this recently in the rioting in Los Angeles following the
verdict in the Rodney King trial or, previously, in the riots that
plagued a large number of American cities in the mid- and late 1960s.
These disturbances were often triggered by political events, such as
incidents of police brutality, failures in the criminal justice system, or
the assassination of public leaders, but they invariably reduced to vio-
lent acts aimed at neighborhood retail establishments - the institu-
tions which possessed what those living in the poorer neighborhoods
do not have, what a police officer in Los Angeles recently described as
"the basic luxuries that we all take for granted."'7 A similar dissatis-
faction has also been expressed in the growth of illegal industries,
above all the drug trade, staffed as it is by those who see trafficking in
drugs as their only way of getting a BMW or otherwise enjoying the
riches of our consumer culture.
Material dissatisfaction played an important role - arguably the
critical one - in destabilizing the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe




and in inspiring the changes that occurred in the Soviet Union. But
neither the material failures of socialism nor the glitter of the West
should obscure the powerful forms of material dissatisfaction, rooted
in inequality, to which all capitalist regimes give rise.
An appreciation of these tensions between democracy and capital-
ism should lead, perhaps not to despair, but to a more skeptical atti-
tude toward the new turn in world history. Socialism may no longer
be a viable option - we may all be capitalists now - but the reform-
ers in the East should not lull themselves into believing that robust
and unmodified capitalism will necessarily and unqualifiedly further
democratic values. The Pinochet years in Chile painfully warn against
such an easy assumption. My warning is, however, even stronger:
Capitalism is not simply compatible with authoritarianism, but in
some ways may lead in that direction.
Obviously, the course of world history cannot be reversed, but,
mindful of the dangers to democratic values posed by capitalism, my
hope is that those shepherding the transition from socialism to capital-
ism will pause and consider a number of measures that would lessen
those dangers. They might adopt measures to protect against growing
inequalities of wealth, curb monopoly power, prevent informational
industries from falling captive to the market, place ceilings on cam-
paign contributions and expenditures, foster worker participation, pro-
tect workers who criticize their firms, and strengthen intermediate
organizations that might serve as schools of citizenship.
Admittedly, some of these measures may have their roots in social-
ist ideals and entail significant state intervention into the economy, but
they should not for that reason be rejected in a frenzied attempt to
bury the past. All capitalist societies have measures comparable to
these, without ever threatening their characterization as "capitalistic."
Some are departures from the theory of capitalism, conceived in ab-
stract and formal terms, but they are limited, qualified departures,
rooted in a desire to further a value - democracy - that capitalism is
supposed to further.
A battle still needs to be fought. It will not be the battle that has
dominated the twentieth century, between capitalism and socialism,
but rather a battle within capitalism. Passions might not run as high,
for the divisions are less clear-cut, but the stakes and concerns are
every bit as great. Aside from the strange case of Joseph Schumpeter,
8
it was not a consideration of efficiency that drew most intellectuals to
8. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 188-99 (3d ed.
1950).
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socialism, but largely a commitment to democracy. Now the chal-
lenge is to see whether that very same ideal can be achieved within the
capitalist framework: to make "capitalist democracy" a reality.
